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Introduction 
 
The historiography of sports doping and anti-doping is littered with examples of weak 
scholarship. All too often unsubstantiated claims made by one author have been 
reproduced by later authors. For example, it has been claimed by many writers that 
the first recorded death due to drug abuse in sports was that of the Welsh cyclist 
Arthur Linton in 1886. A number of writers also make broad claims about doping as 
being commonplace in late 19th century European sport.  Similarly it has been claimed 
that the winner of the 1904 Olympic marathon, Tom Hicks, was given strychnine and 
brandy; and that the disqualified ‘winner’ of the 1908 Olympic marathon Dorando 
Pietri was given stimulants. Some have claimed that the Nazis gave their athletes 
steroids and amphetamines. And moving into the post-war period, a frequently cited 
claim is that the Danish cyclist who died at the 1960 Rome Olympics had been given 
amphetamines.1 The principle problem will all of the above examples is that none of 
the writers who make such claims bother to ask basic questions of history, evidence 
and method such as: where is the supporting documentation which can form the basis 
for historical knowledge? There is in fact no evidence to support the notion that 
Linton died due to drugs – he died in 1896 and his obituary states that the cause was 
typhoid fever. There is evidence of Hicks’ coach, Charles Lucas, giving him 
strychnine and brandy as written up by Lucas himself in the 1904 official Olympic 
Report. This obviously begs the question whether or not strychnine was seen as either 
morally or physically disreputable. There is also some evidence that Pietri took 
stimulants.2 But there is no evidence about the Nazis3 and no evidence that Jensen 
took amphetamines.4
 
More broadly, most of the contributors to this field allow themselves to repeat earlier 
claims of doping because they are pursuing some idea about drug misuse that is 
actually a construction of late 20th century modernity. So we are led to believe that 
Linton died, Hicks and Pietri collapsed and were close to death, Jensen died: all 
proving the assumptions of anti-doping to be correct. There is a specific agenda here 
to demonstrate that history shows us that drugs have always been a problem when 
used in sport. 
 
John Hoberman’s contribution to the field: an overview 
 
Perhaps the one author who has retained both a critical detachment from the 
assumptions of anti-doping, and who has demonstrated a preference for primary 
source material, is John Hoberman. He consistently produces a vast array of new 
material and posits a range of challenging questions. There is no doubt he has 
progressed the historical study of drug use in sport more than any other scholar. The 
major works are the 1992 ground-breaking book Mortal Engines: The Science of 
Performance and the Dehumanization of Sport, and the impressive 2005 monograph 
Testosterone Dreams: Rejuvenation, Aphrodisia, Doping. Combined with numerous 
journal articles, book chapters and conference papers, his output on the history of 
drugs in sport spans two decades and is wide-ranging and comprehensive. He does not 
approach the issue from a single conceptual or disciplinary perspective. He uses 
history to make sociological comments, and he is often deliberately provocative, 
finding arguments that will challenge common thinking and using confident 
(sometimes over-confident) language to drive home specific points.  
 
The less impressive consequence however is that the reader can feel bewildered, 
unsure as to what exactly is being argued and if the historiographic methods used 
support the conclusions made. Often, especially in his monographs, it is very 
challenging to find an overarching framework, a set of key ideas, or a consistent 
paradigm. Reading John Hoberman’s historical writings on doping and anti-doping 
can lead to both admiration at the scope of his scholarship and frustration at the lack 
of clear purpose.  
 
Taking his writings on doping as a whole, if the reader was looking for historical 
insight into the contemporary debate on liberalisation they would find contrasting and 
sometimes contradictory statements. He attacks both the failings of anti-doping and 
the excesses of doping cultures. This apparent generic criticism may at first seem like 
critical detachment, a valuable approach to a politicised and emotive field. However, 
scratching beneath the surface one finds an underlying theme of conservatism, 
nostalgia, and anti-modernity though arguably over time this is shifted towards 
pragmatism, realism and disappointment. Certainly, even a consideration of the two 
monograph titles and sub-titles suggests a weakening of the original trenchant critique 
of high performance sport towards a reluctant acceptance of modern society’s quest 
for performance in the body, the bedroom, the boardroom and the sports field. 
 
This discussion of his work begins with the most obvious question of his position on 
drug use in sport. This will lead on to considering a much more complex underlying 
theme in his writing – a critique of modernity and sport – through examples of his 
historical analysis and a broader review of his anxieties about modernity and its 
futures. The final section discusses Hoberman’s style of research and writing to argue 
that his non-traditional, arguably non-empirical approach, to history opens him up to 
criticism for over-elaboration to the point of invention for the sake of being 
provocative. While such an approach encourages readers to review and reflect, it does 
not necessarily lend confidence towards accuracy, validity and balance.  
 
Pro or Anti- Drugs in Sport? 
 
Perhaps it is not the job of the historian to make a judgement on ethical values or 
policies. Equally, though, it can be argued that historians always bring their prejudices 
to their work regardless of whether these are acknowledged explicitly. The value of 
historical scholarship can be that it helps inform contemporary debates. In a subject 
area like doping, it is almost impossible for a historian to distance themselves from 
the controversies surrounding doping and anti-doping in practice. Hoberman laces his 
writings with emotive representations and questions that challenge the reader to 
engage with complex problems. Yet, the reader is constantly trying to work out what 
position he is arguing for.  
 
Going back to 1992, the Preface to Mortal Engines offers a personal testimony that 
might help explain the author’s ambivalence. While training as a runner, someone 
offered him a substance that would make him faster and stronger. This turned out to 
be powered amino acids, not especially strong or even illegal: they are now available 
at some high street stores. He did not consider the ethical issues, just accepted the 
offer and does not tell us if the powders worked. However, he does expand on his 
self-reflections, 
 
The real meaning of this episode was the intoxicating feeling – still unique to 
my experience – that I might actually become capable of unprecedented 
performances. This was a ‘peak experience’ I have never forgotten, and it has 
partially tempered my own judgements of athletes who take drugs in secret to 
outperform their competitors. I do not think they should, but I can understand 
something about why they do.5
 
However, this does not stop him criticising a range of episodes of excessive doping. 
Mortal Engines begins with the death of West German heptathlete Birgit Dressler at 
only 26 years old in 1987. Hoberman overlays this with a series of accusations against 
specific individuals and her own ambitions that led to her to take heavy doses of 
steroids and pain-killers. The critical focus is on the structure of elite sports and the 
obsession with success, 
 
The Birgit Dressel affair offers a comprehensive portrait of modern high-
performance sport in miniature. The cast of characters is complete: the 
ambitious athlete and her trainer-companion, both hoping to escape from their 
cramped attic apartment into the brightly illuminated world of international 
stardom; the sports officials who take the necessity of illicit drug use for granted 
and therefore tolerate or even encourage the use of performance-enhancing 
drugs; and the physician whose need to associate with athletes rendered him 
unfit to distinguish between maintaining the body’s health and boosting its 
performance with medically reckless procedures.6
 
This sort of explicit condemnation of the risks inherent in doping runs throughout 
Hoberman’s work as if he cannot help wanting to remind readers of the health 
consequences.7 In Mortal Engines he discusses the idea proposed by a Swedish 
strength coach in 1984 that doping was a progressive development comparable to a 
new technology like fibreglass poles for vaulters. Such pro-doping positions are 
condemned as ‘flawed by naiveté about the pathological consequences of steroid use 
and about the social dynamics of steroid abuse both inside and outside elite sports 
circles’.8 Towards the end of the same book, after a detailed discussion of doping 
issues in German sport, he agonises over the perilous state of anti-doping policy, 
 
Today the national alliance among sports physicians, officials, and politicians 
discourages statements of principle while perpetuating the bureaucratic 
arrangements that guarantee the future of doping. Our final question is whether 
or not international governance might break this monopoly of power.9
 
After reviewing a range of barriers to effective international control, the question then 
arises as to whether or not modern societies could or should simply accept the 
existence and use of drugs like steroids. The final chapter of the book considers the 
consequences of such a shift in attitude in terms, as will be discussed below, that 
construct the problem in Biblical terms as being about reshaping human essence in a 
way never intended by God or Nature. The point being that doping is constructed in 
the first instance as a problem for sport, that controls to stop it are criticised for their 
flaws, and then doping is represented as one of the great problems for humanity. 
 
By the time Testosterone Dreams is published, his position has changed slightly as he 
is more prepared to accept that anti-doping has fatal ideological and practical 
problems. And times have changed: no longer is doping about the USSR and GDR 
abuses, but examples like the 1998 Tour de France Festina affair and the varied 
response to baseball hero Mark McGwire’s positive test, show that in liberal societies 
where doping is a choice, some athletes and sports fans think it is an acceptable 
choice. He reiterates warning about the health consequences by pointing to the deaths 
of West German shot-putter Ralf Reichenbach in 1998 and American sprinter 
Florence Griffith Joyner in 1999 as being related to steroid use. ‘Neither these deaths 
nor rumours about doping-related death lists could persuade most elite athletes that 
steroids were truly hazardous’.10 However, even this contains a reluctant acceptance 
that athletes have the choice and while we might despair over their risk-taking and 
their lack of consideration for ethics, they are aware of the potential outcomes and 
still make the decision to use drugs. 
 
This leads to a series of dilemmas, tensions, contradictions, failings and ambiguities, 
‘The anti-doping campaign in sport can thus be seen as a kind of popular referendum 
on enhancements: Given the choice, does the public prefer to watch drug-free athletes 
or winning athletes?’11 Such questions are not given direct answers, and perhaps the 
weight of historical complexity cannot allow direct answers. However, there is a hint 
of explanation for this in Hoberman’s response to Verner Møller’s comprehensive 
body of work in this area. Møller offers a philosophical deconstruction of the 
rationales for anti-doping and proposes that anti-doping is a contravention of the 
modernist vision of sport and the Enlightenment ideals of individual freedom of 
choice, 
 
Møller’s work is an essential antidote to the standard anti-doping doctrine that 
generally ignores the sociological and economic dimensions of the doping 
phenomenon. At the same time, I do not share his view that the right to practice 
doping is an inherent part of elite sport.12
 
In other words, he is willing to accept Møller’s analysis but is not happy, in a 
subjective sense, with the implications. This tells us something of Hoberman’s 
position – a questioning of anti-doping but an acceptance that it could and should be 
more effective. Though, as will be discussed in due course, the above quote is not an 
accurate representation of Møller’s arguments.  
 
There is a powerful analytical thread that runs through his work that questions why 
societies have been so concerned about the doped athlete. In Mortal Engines, the 
following objective is set out, ‘Our ultimate goal is to determine whether or not the 
doping of athletes deserves the unique stigma it has acquired since the 1920s.13 And 
this is soon followed by reference to a central conceptual component, ‘The ubiquity of 
drugs, and their fundamental role in human life over millennia, are of crucial 
significance to our inquiry, since the distinction between what is “natural” and what is 
“unnatural” is at the heart of the twentieth century controversy over the use of 
performance-enhancing drugs in sport’.14  
 
This is a fascinating but complex turn. On one hand, we can see how Hoberman 
dislikes the health implications of doping, and agonises over the social circumstances 
within which excessive doping might occur. When athletes become obsessed with 
victory, when their entourage fail to protect their health, when external concerns like 
nationalism lead to abusive practices: these are the problem areas. However, this 
criticism of doping does not quite sit easily with the moral relativism found 
elsewhere. In his later writings, he has become much more aware of the flaws in anti-
doping; even to the extent of suggesting that the West’s criticism of the GDR’s 
system actually shows that ‘our sense of what constitutes doping is socially 
conditioned’.15 From there he goes on to argue almost in favour of doping because it 
is merely a social idea and that ‘restricting the idea of doping to athletes is 
sociologically indefensible, since many other people pursue enhancements through 
drugs’.16 In fact, it is possible that the 13 years between Mortal Engines and 
Testosterone Dreams have led Hoberman to increased disillusionment with the 
principles and practices of anti-doping. He certainly focuses a lot of creative energy 
on the inconsistencies and ineffectiveness of the IOC’s anti-doping policy, especially 
under Samaranch. At the same time, he also admits the philosophical weakness in 
anti-doping,  
 
Condemnations of doping during the past century have typically relied on a 
combination of ethical and medical arguments – drugs are both unfair and 
medically dangerous – that was inherently unstable, because it implied that 
doping drugs violated both norms. This definition introduced instability into the 
definition of doping in two ways. First, a performance-enhancing drug without 
harmful side effects would meet the criteria for medical safety and should 
therefore escape censure; similarly, an agreement among competitor athletes to 
use the same drug would appear to make its use fair.17  
 
This is reminiscent of Møller’s philosophical and analytical approach to the subject, 
and a departure from most of the historical offerings on doping that assert the basic 
values of anti-doping. However, Hoberman still seems hopeful that better governance 
can improve anti-doping in practice despite the above realisation that the project 
contains far from fundamental problems.  
 
So he focuses attention on the social distinctiveness of the athlete from other workers 
and artists. Why should they be treated as a sacrosanct group who should act and 
think in a way that is not only different to others but which runs contrary to their self-
identified goals of sporting achievement? Indeed, he makes this one of the core 
statements of Testosterone Dreams, ‘Why modern society has made such a drama out 
of doping is perhaps the deepest question that this book attempts to explore. Why 
would a civilization bent on maximizing performance of various kinds require certain 
performers to exercise self-restraint?’18 The answer he provides is very interesting. He 
argues that athletes are manageable but symbolic target for a broad trend which aims 
to reassert the boundaries of human nature in the face of such technological 
innovations as cloning and genetic manipulation. So ‘doping scandals are symbolic 
demonstrations of our unwillingness to succumb to unbridled experimentation on the 
human organism’.19 Athletes are expendable role models in this dishonest project. 
 
Taking such a position that refers doping to wider contextualising debates, means that 
Hoberman can criticise the hypocrisy of anti-doping without going so far as to 
legitimise doping. The implication is that if sports allows doping then it removes one 
of the last barriers to full-scale human engineering; but we are stuck in an impasse 
because restricting doping singles out sport for all the wrong reasons as being ‘above’ 
or ‘better than’ all the other drugs, enhancements and messing around with humanity 
that goes on elsewhere in society. This means Hoberman’s critique of doping is really 
a much broader discussion on modernity, humanity and technology; of the 
problematic symbiosis of high performance sport and medicine which leads to the 
enhancement innovations purely to serve the cult of victory. The next sections of this 
paper consider two examples wherein the implicit critique of modernity informs the 
interpretation of specific time periods. 
 
The Past as a More Innocent Age: the 19th century 
 
Hoberman discusses a number of contributors to the history of medicine, including 
such scientists as Charles-Edouard Brown-Séquard aqnd Francis Galton. He has a 
tendency to over-state the place of such individuals in this history. So, despite the 
flaws in his research and the criticisms of his contemporaries, Brown-Séquard is 
labelled ‘the father of steroids’. In this section, the focus will be on Hoberman’s 
discussion of French physiologist Phillip Tissié who was at one point close to de 
Coubertin before making it clear he did not like the idea of high performance sport. 
Hoberman uses Tissié to prove that this was a period of comparative moral virtue 
before the sports-medicine nexus produced doping up achievement-oriented athletes, 
 
By the standards of our technological and sports-obsessed age, the last decades 
of the nineteenth and the early decades of the twentieth centuries were a 
premodern world in terms of physiological investigations of human 
performance. Dynamic athleticism was a peripheral preoccupation rather than 
the self-evident ideal it has become for many people in widely varying cultures 
across the globe.20
 
Tissié’s experimental work with a cyclist called Stéphane is of some interest because 
he used the athlete to test out the properties of various substances on performance. 
This could be interpreted an early example of doping science, of the application of 
sports science to performance. However, Hoberman goes to some lengths to 
demonstrate that Tissié did not represent the continuity of a modern practice but 
rather some form of discontinuity: that he was part of a pre-modern world. His 
experimental work might have ‘made him a pioneer in the field of sports medicine’ 
but importantly, ‘he was not an active proponent of high-performance athletics’.21
 
One reason for this is that he was a generalist interested in diet and the body, a second 
reason is that these were early days for performance sport. Hoberman cannot help 
pointing out to the reader the risks in misinterpreting the past by using the paradigms 
of the present, 
 
The paradox of Tissié’s scientific career, from our standpoint, is that a man who 
recorded early and prescient observations on the physiological and 
psychological consequences of extreme athletic exertion actually disapproved of 
the high-performance sport of his era. But it is really our own ‘modern’ 
assumptions about the relationship between research and its eventual 
applications that make Tissié’s viewpoint seem paradoxical in the first place. 
Almost a century of science and technology separates us from Tissié’s early 
work in the area of what is now called ‘exercise physiology’, and in the course 
of this century the pursuit of athletic records has become one of the 
unquestioned norms of our popular culture. Therefore, we tend to assume that 
the whole point of scientific research is its application on behalf of tangible, and 
often measurable, gains.22
 
Hoberman implores the reader not to view the past in terms of the present, but it is 
hard to see any reason for describing Tissié’s career other than to do precisely that. In 
offering a strong case study example of someone we have to assume was high profile 
and influential, Hoberman specifically attacks the late twentieth century assumption 
about science and sport. By arguing that premodern physiologists distanced 
themselves from the cult of victory, from the obsessive pursuit of sporting 
achievement, he offers a benign vision of the past and an implicit critique of 
modernity.  
 
However this critique is meaningless without knowledge of the ‘doping regimes’ of 
the former GDR and USSR that pursued a goal of nationalist-oriented sports success 
informed at every stage by legal and illegal applications of sports medicine; or of the 
subterfuge that has characterised the history of doping in Western nations. The career 
of a relatively obscure French scientist would be meaningless unless he helped create 
something which became important later on. Hoberman’s point is that the sports 
physiology Tissié developed departed from his much more reasonable ambivalence 
about performance sport. Indeed, if Tissié had won his argument with de Coubertin 
about the value of performance sport the history of doping would, it seems, have been 
different,  
 
We should remember that less than a century ago European scientists were 
discussing pharmacological aids to athletic performance without a qualm. But 
when a proliferation of such studies coincided with the sports boom of the 
1920s, when athletic achievement took on new significance and now became 
vulnerable to the threat of ‘manipulation’, a ‘doping crisis’ was born … 
Eventually, a more determined and systematic approach to human performance 
would produce the intractable doping problem of our era.23
 
The language used reveals the sentiments, the past is a simpler place where the 
‘intractable’ problem of doping did not exist because sports medicine and sports 
performance had not yet combined to change the very nature of human essence, 
abilities, desires and possibilities. 
 
The Past as a More Innocent Age: the 1950s 
 
It has been broadly argued by a number of writers in this field that doping took on the 
nature of a ‘crisis’ in the 1960s. There are some unanswered questions about this 
change. Was it rooted in a material sense that athletes were suddenly taking a lot more 
drugs? This is possible as more drugs were available and there were no laws against 
doping until the mid-1960s or testing systems until the late-1960s. Moreover, this can 
easily been connected to criticisms of the politicisation, professionalisation and 
commercialisation of sport. In other words, athletes were driven to take risks, at times 
encouraged to do so by sports doctors and by fanatical supporters, and so in an 
increasingly medicalised society athletes would also use performance enhancements. 
In this perspective, anti-doping was a natural, normal, understandable and morally 
correct response to a clear problem. However, it is just as possible that doping was a 
moral panic invented by those who feared the influence of external factors in sport 
and whose traditionalism led to a dislike of the seriousness given to elite international 
sport by the 1960s. The crisis could easily be interpreted as a legalistic, moralistic and 
bureaucracy construction that would not have had the same sort of profile or public 
interest had there not been a series of fanatical endeavours to stop it.  
 
Hoberman does not directly address these issues despite their obvious importance and 
centrality to a historical understanding of doping and anti-doping. He does though 
offer an interesting and insightful discussion of the period just before the crisis began: 
the 1950s. This had the potential of addressing the gap in knowledge about the 
origins, emergence and consolidation of anti-doping as a social phenomenon. He 
characterises this decade as one before the governmental consensus about anti-doping 
had been achieved: ‘uncertainty about the immorality of performance-enhancing 
drugs was evident during the 1950s’.24 Since there were no clear rules or guidelines 
about what constituted doping and if indeed doping should be disallowed, there was a 
different form of openness on the subject that would soon disappear under the 
hegemonic pressure of anti-doping. He goes on then to suggest that the 1950s ‘were in 
some ways an age of innocence that had not yet encountered the consequences of 
effective performance-enhancing drugs’.25 And in an article which focuses in more 
detail on this time period, he claims that the varying ‘responses to the amphetamine 
episode of 1957 evoke a simpler age that appears to have been unaffected by the idea 
that drugs might boost athletic performance’.26
 
The nuances of this are crucial but unclear. Was the decade more innocent because 
the drugs being used were not as risky as drugs like steroids that would be used by 
athletes in the 1960s? Or was it the lack of awareness in the sports community about 
the risks involved in any drug use? Given that amphetamine was the main drug of 
choice, the answer may lie in both the comparison between that drug and steroids and 
the changing nature of amphetamine which had been lauded for general health 
benefits throughout the 1940s and 1950s but by the early 1960s was being questioned 
for its addictive properties and its role in violent or anti-establishment cultures. 
Moreover, other drugs like tobacco were being increasingly regulated in the 1960s.27
 
Hoberman remains focused on sport in his analysis. He argues that the important 
element was the distinction between amateurs and professionals though he does not 
tell us if this was one of perception or material reality. The professional cyclists who 
were largely assumed to use drugs were ‘often ignored in the early British discussions 
of doping, because these competitors belonged to a different social world’.28 Although 
it is not clear where these concerns were being expressed, Hoberman argues that the 
widespread assumption was that professionals had a different set of ethical values 
from amateurs. The real controversy or ‘consternation’ emerged in response to 
amateur athletes while professionals’ ‘right to use drugs was taken for granted’.29 And 
‘well-informed people’ assumed that professional athletes ‘enjoyed a tacit exemption 
from the ethical standards that applied to amateurs’.30  
 
The analysis may well be correct though it is not supported by a great deal of 
evidence. It may lead the reader to assume that the critique of doping is actually a 
critique of professionalism. If the amateur ethos had remained in place then the 
doping crisis would not have developed as it did in the 1960s. As he notes, the late 
1950s began a time when ‘the conflict between sportsmanship and athletic ambition 
that had been intensifying since the beginning of the century now had a 
pharmacological dimension that could not be ignored’.31 Certainly, the discourse of 
the pure amateur who would not defile himself or sport by using drugs, and at the 
same time would not allow the impurity of money to ruin sport, is a common theme 
among pro-Olympic writers throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The fantasy of romantic 
idealism has been a pervasive ideological undercurrent of anti-doping. Which makes 
the 1950s a really important period as it set the scene for the arrival of organised anti-
doping.  
 
Given this, Hoberman’s next stage of reflection is all the more fascinating. He 
continues on to claim that professionals, particularly cyclists, were less at risk from 
the health consequences of doping because of the medical supervision that came with 
the honest use of doping drugs. He quotes an American sportswriter, ‘Deaths are rare, 
and occur mostly in amateur races. Professionals are experienced in such matters and 
use drugs only within prescribed limits’.32 It seems therefore that the problem in the 
1950s was not constructed along the lines of health and fair play, as would become 
standard anti-doping doctrine, but the anxieties that amateurs would mess around with 
drugs without the benefits of experience or of medical guidance. It was fine for 
professionals, who knew what they were doing and had a right to earn their living. 
However, it is not entirely clear if it was ethics or health risks that should deter the 
amateur athlete from using drugs. And it is not clear if the ‘age of innocence’ 
reflected a lack of knowledge or a lack of widespread usage of harder drugs. What is 
clear is that ‘innocence’ was a privilege afforded to amateurs; the last generation of a 
pre-modern era when sport was about sport, and not about the various external 
pressures and rewards of the modern period. This certainly stands in contrast to his 
view of later time periods when, as he describes it, ‘the persistence of doping’ arose 
from ‘the pharmacological ingenuity of athletes and doctors’ combined with the 
‘political and economic demands that athletes are expected to meet’.33
 
In the 1950s, amateurs ‘were supposed to be immune to the financial pressures that 
caused professionals to dope themselves’ and to ‘other kinds of ambitions’ that would 
lead to doping.34 They were seen as morally superior to professionals, not least 
because they could exercise the ‘ideal of self-restraint’ and demonstrate their honour 
since ‘the rejection of drugs originated in a refusal to despoil the glory of sport by 
violating ethical standards that were seen as part of the amateur tradition’.35 And so, 
Hoberman claims (though without any supporting reference) that the ‘idea that doping 
was medically dangerous contained its own kind of moral admonition, as if Nature 
were bent on punishing those who sought to violate the limits that had been imposed 
upon the human body’.36
 
In what seems a contrary example, Hoberman discusses the musings of Adolphe 
Abrahams, brother of Harold Abrahams, sports physician and founder of the British 
Association of Sports Medicine. One would imagine Abrahams taking up the amateur 
anti-doping position quite clearly. However, in both 1953 and 1958 he argued that 
there was no clear reason to prevent athletes taking drugs to enhance performance 
especially if such drugs were not unhealthy and were universally available. Abrahams 
claimed that such a practice would not disturb the conscience of the sporting world, 
and so Hoberman claims that he ‘opens the door to the legitimate use of performance-
enhancing drugs by athletes’ and he had an ‘open scepticism toward the ethic of 
sportsmanship’.37 This is taken as indicative of a much wider debate that has 
fascinated Hoberman over the past 20 years, he claims that Abrahams ‘had chosen to 
open the Pandora’s box that lurks in any honest discussion of human enhancements – 
the problem of defining normal human functioning and the intolerable deviations 
from this norm’.38  
 
By the later 1950s, amateurs had acquired ‘professional-style ambitions’ and so 
coaches experimented more frequently with a range of drugs for performance. This is 
framed not as a revolt against sportsmanship, but as a meaningful and honest attempt 
to push the boundaries of human possibility. Australian swimming coach Forbes 
Carlile gave his young athletes potassium biphosphate which he did not see an ethical. 
One Australian swimmer, Judy Joy admitted publicly in 1957 that some of her team-
mates use amphetamines. Hoberman takes these examples as evidence of an age of 
innocence, ‘The crucial factor was the guilt-free mentality of those who were trying to 
reach and exceed human limits’; they exemplified ‘the romantic doctrine of athletic 
heroism before the discovery that doping was a sin’.39 So the turning point was an 
opening up of drug use to amateurs as well as professionals. Once that had happened 
the cultural impulses to restrict and define human essence and limits began to take 
hold in sport. These experiments were no longer to be tolerated. When anti-doping 
ideology really became a force, the principles of honesty were central to much of the 
emerging discourse. Doping was constructed as deceitful and contrary to the values of 
sportsmanship in which the athlete must strive to succeed within the limits set for 
them by Nature itself. The key concept by the 1960s was ‘artificial’ – an explicit 
reference to some supposed notion of what was natural.  
 
The Limits of the Human Body: Fear of Modernity 
 
Ostensibly it is difficult to explain why the open discussion of doping in the 1950s is 
presented by Hoberman with such respect and as reflective of an age of innocence. He 
never explicitly admits this, but one suspects that the real focus of critical attention is 
given to steroids. This reason for this is that steroids represent a much more 
significant position on the spectrum of human modification and have been used in 
more abusive contexts than other drugs. However, it also seems that his feelings 
towards this have become more circumspect over time. 
 
Hoberman’s anxieties about changing the essential human body are set out in an early 
paper entitled ‘Sport and the Technological Image of Man’, first presented at a 
symposium in 1986 and published in 1988. He takes as his starting point the anti-
technology position espoused by Richard von Weizsäcker in 1985, who was then the 
President of West Germany and was speaking at a meeting of the West German 
National Olympic Committee. Weizsäcker was expressing a deeply conservative view 
of sport and technology, arguing that ‘whereas science and technology can be 
progressively transformed, the human body cannot be. The temptation to treat the 
human body as if it were a machine comes into conflict with our most basic ideas of 
what a human being should be, and the result of this conflict is a reckoning with the 
idea of human limits’.40 There is an underlying value system here about what is right 
and good, the language used – such as ‘temptation’ implies a corruption of ethical 
virtues. Hoberman offers an unusually frank subjective position in response to 
Weizsäcker, 
 
It is my view that the comprehensive technologizing of high-performance sport 
contains, and in some ways conceals, an agenda for human development for 
which high-performance athletes serve as ideal models. It is also my opinion 
that this anthropological agenda is a sinister one that transcends, even as it 
includes, the cultivation of certain body-types for sportive purposes. High-
performance sport has become an exercise in human engineering that aims at 
producing not simply an athletic type, but a human type as well.41
 
He focuses on drugs as the ‘notorious procedures … that change, or threaten to 
change, the human body’.42 The first on the list are steroids, then human growth 
hormone, beta-blockers, amphetamines, other stimulants and blood doping. In other 
words, Hoberman sets out an argument against doping on the grounds of the ‘sinister’ 
ways in which the drugs and techniques used play with the nature of humanity. And 
this is constructed in explicitly negative terms, ‘What we can confirm as of today is, 
first, that the manipulative sport technologies are poisoning relationships throughout 
the world of sport, and second, that they are here to stay’.43 He goes on to argue that 
sports science treats the ‘human organism as though it were a machine, or as though it 
ought to be a machine’.44 And again, in an unusually frank passage admits an almost 
profound attachment to the idea that this is wrong, ‘The implicit demand … in my 
view, is a streamlined and decomplexified image of the human being’.45 And the 
conclusion links these problems to the very idea of modernity and progress: ‘Sport 
incorporates the man-machine synthesis because it is a modernism’.46  
 
So here we have the most up-front set of statements that reveal some of the impulses, 
frustrations and energies that lie behind 20 years of writing on the subject of doping in 
sport. The principle focus for his critical thinking have been the wider social 
ramifications of doping set out in terms of both philosophical and anthropological 
approaches to ‘humanness’.  
 
The Essence of Humanity? 
 
Only four years after the publication of ‘Sport and the Technological Image of Man’, 
Hoberman set out a series of arguments against the sport and science nexus in Mortal 
Engines. He begins the book with the death of Birgit Dressel, but precedes that 
episode with a quote from Bertolt Brecht, ‘Great sport begins where good health 
ends’. This is an important quote in itself, it suggests a striking contrast between the 
‘good’ of recreational exercise focused sport, and the ‘bad’ of serious, competitive, 
obsessive performance sport. Dressel is obviously positioned as a victim of the ‘bad’ 
side of sport. The book contains numerous references to science fiction writers and 
speculative scientists who, in various ways, have fantasised about using technology to 
surpass human limitations. It is the case that one of the key features of Western 
modernity has been a concerted attempt to resolve the problem of fatigue in order to 
make more efficient and productive citizens. What Hoberman tends to do in Mortal 
Engines, however, is to make us think the absurdities of such fantasists should be 
taken seriously.  
 The book ends with a re-assertion of the humanity principle in response to the work of 
20th century British scientist J. B. S. Haldane who, according to Hoberman, 
‘anticipated the genetic engineering of athletes’.47 Hoberman tells us that Haldane 
thought science ‘would make possible the genetic engineering of superendowed 
individuals capable of amazing athletic or surgical feats’.48 The problem with 
Hoberman’s representation of people like Haldane is that he provides us with very 
little idea of the context of their work. He tells us about their absurd excesses, but not 
if these had any impact on the wider science community or were taken seriously by 
anyone. Nonetheless, Haldane provides the platform for a highly dramatic end to 
Mortal Engines which put drug use in sport, or any modifications for the sake of 
sport, into the grandest of all historical frames, 
 
Haldane also dreamed of gene-grafting techniques that would permit the 
crossing of men and beasts, of legless astronauts, and other specially adapted 
creatures – a vision perfectly suited to the development of athletes who would 
be monsters as well. The supreme biological question confronting mankind 
today is whether Haldane’s vision of the pursuit of organismic efficiency will 
prevail over the human image that appeared in the Old Testament thousands of 
years ago.49
 
Given that doping is afforded the deepest of all historical and existential meanings, 
the earlier sections in which Hoberman condemns steroid use reveal that what bothers 
him are the changes to the human ‘being’, ‘Today the most urgent problem is to 
determine whether anabolic steroids, the most notorious and widespread ergogenic 
drugs, are uniquely dangerous to the ethos of sport. The medical and psychological 
hazards of steroid use suggest that indeed they are, not least because of the ways these 
performance-boosting drugs affect the very identity of the athlete’.50 So he criticises 
the masculinizing impact steroids have on women and argues that their affect on the 
‘endocrinological system’ makes them far more meaningful than stimulant type drugs 
such as caffeine or amphetamines. Similarly, he is disturbed by the process of blood 
doping for its symbolic and physiological attributes. He claims that, ‘the combination 
of technology and infusion that mimics the Frankenstein procedure and thereby raises 
the question of who or what this athlete actually is’.51 He goes on, 
 
While it is true that other substances and methods also modify the athlete, these 
three techniques express a heightened level of scientific ambition aimed at 
modifying human functioning and identity. They are properly controversial 
because they symbolize scientific ambition out of control … Whereas high-
performance sport has always been an experimental field of human activity, it 
has now become an experimental theatre in which the drama of human self-
transformation, however veiled by old pieties and inhibitions, is displayed for all 
to see.52
 
By 2005, his position on steroid use as set out in Testosterone Dreams is much less 
about life, nature and about what God intended us to be. Though he does remain 
troubled that sport has become an ideological battleground between ‘modifiers’ and 
‘traditionalists’. Perhaps this is where he reveals his own form of traditionalism, that 
while he cannot admit to being completely anti-modification he does despair at what 
is happening in sport. Two chapters in the book show a more ambivalent view: one 
which shows sports fans do not always mind their heroes using drugs; and another 
which describes the failure of anti-doping to prevent sport becoming this focal point 
for a much wider struggle over human enhancement.  
 
However, by this stage he concedes the ground that many sections of modern society 
accept the notion of enhancement or modification for the sake of either productivity 
or artistic creativity. So what concerns him is that sport is singled out by 
traditionalists to be the last place where participants need to demonstrate their ‘natural 
purity’. He writes, ‘modern society both embraces the productive effects of doping 
drugs and disapproves of them with a prohibitionist passion that is rooted in the 
traditional idea that socially disreputable drugs are consumed by dysfunctional 
addicts. The sports world thus at the same time promotes doping and the campaign to 
abolish it’.53 In other words, the problem lies with how drugs are understood and how 
sport is understood. Drugs for performance enhancement are associated with the 
‘evils’ of narcotics when they are so obviously not like that when used in a 
supervised, controlled and focused way. Sport is seen as an opportunity to express 
self-restraint, moral virtue and honest endeavour when it is so obviously also about 
politics, commerce and other social pressures. The analytical focus is therefore on the 
tensions inherent in sport; the critical attention is on those who have failed to resolve 
these tensions. What has subsided over the years is Hoberman’s intense commitment 
to a non-technological image of sport. If anything he seems by to arguing now that 
athletes are merely human, susceptible to the temptations of modern life, and they 
should not be expected to act or think as if they were somehow detached from 
modernity. He has, it seems, accepted that the athlete is not simply a technological 
product of modernity, but someone who can choose how to take part in it.  
 Making History a Drama 
 
The analysis of content as above does bring us closer to what inspires Hoberman, 
what connects most of his writings on doping and how the principle elements have 
changed over time. However, in this final section it will be argued that an analysis of 
style shows that the conventions of historiography are largely ignored, both by 
focusing on secondary or discursive forms of evidence, and by selectively 
misrepresenting specific individuals’ positions. 
 
The example of Haldane is useful here. Hoberman uses his fantasy ideas, not the more 
pragmatic and frankly dull, reality of his scientific research, to raise and discuss 
certain issues. He draws upon a secondary source to make the claims that Haldane 
‘dreamed of gene-grafting techniques that would permit the crossing of men and 
beasts, of legless astronauts, and other specially adapted creatures – a vision perfectly 
suited to the development of athletes who would be monsters as well’.54 Reading the 
source in question, written by Krishna Dronamraju, we find no reference to athletes or 
sportsmen in this sense, only (as Hoberman does note) that the self-control of a 
meditative yogi can be compared to that of a sportsman. However, there is nothing in 
Dronamraju’s text to justify the notion that Haldane predicted a time when athletes 
were monstrous, genetically engineered creatures akin to cross-bred animals. The 
legless astronauts were not, as Hoberman implies, a deliberate genetic manipulation, 
rather Haldane was arguing that men who lost legs due to mutation or accident could 
be ‘specially suited to be astronauts’. This was part what Dronamraju called ‘far-
reaching and speculative’ ideas that focused on the colonisation of Mars and Jupiter. 
Haldane was interested in how humans might have to adapt to higher gravitational 
fields, and thus might be better to be short-legged or quadrupedal. Even more 
ridiculously, he suggested ‘A regressive mutation to the condition of our ancestors in 
the mid-pliocene, with prehensile feet, no appreciable heels, and an ape-like pelvis, 
would be better still’.55 So this was not just pure fantasy but actually, if we wanted to 
take it seriously, proposed a less athletic creature not a specially adapted athlete. 
Elsewhere in Dronamraju’s account, Haldane’s views on more realistic genetic 
therapy are discussed, only to be tempered with the view that Haldane was being too 
optimistic given the psychological and religious barriers to genetic manipulation. 
Dronamraju also suggests that Haldane had in mind the ‘drastic decline of various 
undesired abnormalities’.56  
 
So even when fantasising about new human possibilities using ‘deliberate inductions 
of mutations using chemical agents’, the focus was on health, ‘This could lead to the 
creation of a special breed of superhuman beings who could be as strong and disease-
resistant as many animals while at the same time retaining human consciousness and 
intelligence’.57 This must be where Hoberman read ‘the crossing of men and beasts’, 
and the ‘vision perfectly suited to the development of athletes who would be monsters 
as well’. However, these passages could be read in a more balanced way, as a search 
for selecting and developing certain genetic traits in order to improve the chances of 
survival and health for humankind. More seriously, Hoberman’s description of the 
man as ‘more than a bit of a bully, his heroic services as an officer in the Great War 
taught him the discomfiting lesson that he liked to kill’58 encourages the reader to 
connect the genetic engineering of athletes with the character of a sadistic murderer. 
This does not fit with Julian Huxley’s view that Haldane was ‘a real humanist, in the 
sense that he believed that very human being had immense potentialities’ that if 
properly tapped ‘would give them a richer sense of being, and much greater fulfilment 
in a more worth-while life’.59
 
The context for these insane ramblings is very significant. A point missed by 
Hoberman is that they came from an essay written in 1963 for a CIBA foundation 
symposium. This is fascinating as CIBA were the pharmaceutical company to help 
develop testosterone and steroids, who worked with the American physician John 
Zeigler to find a steroid for sport. Zeigler experimented with many combinations 
through the 1950s and early 1960s before CIBA patented what would be one of the 
most widely used steroids, Dianabol. More than this, the symposium was on ‘the 
future of man’ and Haldane used the forum to speculate ‘on the possibilities for 
human evolution in the next ten thousand years’.60 So, far from being a set of ideas we 
should take seriously in a discussion of doping, these were little more than 
imaginative fancies though it would be interesting to know how they linked to CIBA 
and other speakers in the context of the emerging science of steroids. 
 
A related problem is that Hoberman tends to make slight adjustments to the claims 
others make. Verner Møller has not argued that doping should be allowed: to use 
Hoberman’s words that ‘the right to practice doping is an inherent part of elite sport’. 
Indeed, in the prologue to the English translation of his book The Doping Devil, as 
translated by Hoberman himself, Møller opens with the line: ‘Let me make one thing 
clear at the outset: This book was not written to promote the legalization of doping’.61
 
In the same book as Hoberman’s summary of Møller’s position, the edited collection 
called The Essence of Sport, Møller has a chapter that overviews the nature of sport.62 
In this chapter, Møller discusses doping and cycling in the aftermath of the 1998 
Festina affair. He does not at any point argue that doping should be allowed, instead 
he makes a more complex claim that partially reflects Hoberman’s position in 
Testosterone Dreams, but partially contradicts Hoberman’s more idealistic 
constructions of sport, 
 
The doping hysteria that descended upon the 1998 Tour de France can be 
compared with the public reaction to the bodyline cricket scandal of 1932. 
Indeed, we should not exclude the possibility that a pragmatic attitude towards 
doping will develop along with a tolerance for other kinds of cheating in sport. 
The current tendency towards a growing acceptance of drug taking among 
ordinary people makes this even more likely. In a world of plastic surgery, 
Prozac, Viagra, Rogaine and similar medical solutions to human desires, doping 
will easily be reinterpreted as a way to sustain or enhance human health, 
meaning that doping will no longer violate the modern ideals of health. 
Hereafter the rationality of sport will be given free rein, and that will put an end 
to the illusion that sport is naturally compatible with morality and modesty.63  
 
In a later section on sport as drama, Møller does imply that if we accept that sport is 
about inner drive and passion then it is easier to understand doping as similar to the 
excesses of other creative cultures. The side-effects such as drug taking occur because 
athletes, like artists, musicians and dancers ‘do whatever is necessary to create their 
sublime works and then find themselves trapped in serious abuse or self-destructive 
behaviours’.64 However, this is not the same as proposing liberalisation of doping; 
indeed the language suggest caution in that the side effects are considered ‘serious’ 
and ‘destructive’. Møller’s work is a profound revision of what sport is about, but he 
questions the very basis of sport itself as if to say that sports enthusiasts cannot have it 
both ways, they cannot have committed athletes providing spectacular moments of 
glory and entertainment and expect these athletes not to fall from their pedestals 
occasionally in pursuit of personal achievement and individual creativeness.  
 
Hoberman’s use of Adolphe Abrahams’ contributions to the debate is also worth 
closer analysis. He deliberately ignores some passages that indicate balance or even 
concern about doping. He portrays Abrahams as having opened ‘the door to the 
legitimate use of performance-enhancing drugs by athletes’.65 Hoberman also claims 
that Abrahams saw no reason to object to such drug use except they ‘they were 
ineffective and potentially dangerous’.66 These two summaries are actually different, 
though Hoberman is trying to show that Abrahams was not restrained by ideals of 
amateurism or sportsmanship, and thus was willing to confront doping in more 
realistic terms of efficacy and health. In another point, Hoberman summarises 
Abrahams as follows, 
 
‘What objection could be raised against its use?’ he asks. ‘Only that – to use the 
question-begging term – it would be unsporting to enable athletes to surpass 
records achieved by the giants of the past, who lacked that advantage. I do not 
think the conscience of the sporting world would or need be disturbed’.67  
 
And from there Hoberman comes to the conclusion that Abrahams opens the door to 
legitimisation. The above passage comes from a letter to the Times in July 1953 in the 
wake of discussions on doping held by the newly established British Association of 
Sports Medicine of which Abrahams was one of the founders.68 The letter actually 
offers a much narrower sense of the circumstances under which doping could be 
allowed. Firstly, the drug in question would have to be ‘free from any harm, 
temporary and remote’. Secondly, to avoid secrecy it must be ‘universally available’. 
Abrahams also notes, perhaps naively, that no doctor would ‘by active assistance or 
passive encouragement lend his support’ to the use of unhealthy drugs. On balance 
then this letter is full of caveats and qualifications.  
 
These examples serve to illustrate Hoberman’s tendency to look for one side of the 
dichotomy in every source. He uses other peoples’ ideas to build up a collection of 
extreme positions which he presents, draws back from, critiques, and constructs 
dialectical dilemmas. This means that the everyday struggles of historical research 
are, to an extent, ignored in favour of the dramatic dialogues and discourses. 
Hoberman eschews the archive, the dry policy documents, the wading through 
committee minutes and personal correspondence, or the evidence produced by sports 
organisations about doping. History is sometimes dry and tedious; it needs to be if the 
researcher is to gain a full appreciation of what happened. It also includes searching 
around for potential counter-evidence in places that may not provide any worth 
writing about except a footnote to note the absence of anything important. Instead, 
Hoberman relies upon novels, the public writings of key people, and media stories. He 
does not ask balanced or tedious questions like, for instance, are the opinion of a 
certain individual representative of wider opinion or a very specific cultural milieu? 
Not does he does not bother making too much effort to review the secondary literature 
on the subject. This cannot, therefore, be taking as good history. 
 
In effect, this is not history as in the quest for strong empirical evidence of practices, 
processes, people and organisations. It is not even true to the sources included. A 
weak form of criticism is that Hoberman over-relies on discursive forms of evidence 
which he selects sections of in order to make provocative arguments. He makes the 
reader reflect and think: no bad thing, and perhaps worth the price of traditional 
empiricism. A stronger critique is that this is the tabloidisation of history: a 
misleading, skewed history that distorts evidence, ignores tricky historiographical 
questions, in order to present a fiction based on fictions. This is the desire to tell a 
story dominating the desire to check, verify and explain the evidence. He prefers 
using novels like Frankenstein as conceptual touching points, and using media stories 
to describe public events. More problematically, he seeks out the extremities from his 
sources to construct dichotomous positions as the framework for debate.  
 
Conclusion 
John Hoberman’s contribution to the history of doping and anti-doping is immense. 
He shows admirable determination to root out new material, present fresh ideas, and 
to challenge the ways in which people think about the issues at stake. For this he 
deserves full credit. 
 
Any analysis of his work has to rely on selective representations, not least because 
there is so much ground to cover. The focus of this paper has been on his modernity-
induced anxieties and the ways in which he uses source material. The latter seems 
most problematic: if the reader cannot depend on how a writer uses information then 
the entire project is open to question. There are serious omissions, such as how anti-
doping originated and developed in the 1960s, and history of the science of anti-
doping testing. There are also in places serious absences of contextualising 
information. This is vital when most of the evidence is ‘discourse’: we need to know 
how writers and thinkers impacted on their societies. Just to take one example, was 
Adolphe Abrahams viewed as an expert whose opinions influenced others around 
him? Who else was in this debate and where were the comments expressed? Just as a 
comment on this, the British Association of Sports Medicine had a written statement 
on doping before the highly influential Council of Europe meetings in 1963.69 It 
would be a real contribution to knowledge if historians could established the 
connections between Abrahams, other British Association of Sports Medicine 
members, the writing of this doping statement, how the Council of Europe meetings 
drew from this early initiative, and how other international groups related to these 
processes. Within six years, the balanced and somewhat abstract thinking of 
Abrahams was pushed aside in favour of a much tougher stance on anti-doping. I 
think it is a pity Hoberman focuses so much on the ‘drama’ of Abrahams’ ideas to the 
expense of getting to the heart of anti-doping history. It is examples like this which 
serve to undermine the consistency and strength of a body of work which has so many 
other qualities. 
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